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Abstract
Toddlers readily learn predictive relations between events (e.g., that event A predicts event B). However, they intervene on
A to try to cause B only in a few contexts: When a dispositional agent initiates the event or when the event is described with
causal language. The current studies look at whether toddlers’ failures are due merely to the difficulty of initiating
interventions or to more general constraints on the kinds of events they represent as causal. Toddlers saw a block slide
towards a base, but an occluder prevented them from seeing whether the block contacted the base; after the block
disappeared behind the occluder, a toy connected to the base did or did not activate. We hypothesized that if toddlers
construed the events as causal, they would be sensitive to the contact relations between the participants in the predictive
event. In Experiment 1, the block either moved spontaneously (no dispositional agent) or emerged already in motion (a
dispositional agent was potentially present). Toddlers were sensitive to the contact relations only when a dispositional
agent was potentially present. Experiment 2 confirmed that toddlers inferred a hidden agent was present when the block
emerged in motion. In Experiment 3, the block moved spontaneously, but the events were described either with non-causal
(‘‘here’s my block’’) or causal (‘‘the block can make it go’’) language. Toddlers were sensitive to the contact relations only
when given causal language. These findings suggest that dispositional agency and causal language facilitate toddlers’
ability to represent causal relationships.
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Introduction
Human adults recognize that events that predict each other
sometimes cause each other. This allows us to generate novel
interventions, distinguish spurious associations from genuine
causes, represent physical relationships among events, and engage
in effective exploration [1–5]. However, many researchers have
speculated that this recognition might emerge relatively late in
both phylogeny and ontogeny [2,5–8]. In this study, we use
a looking-time method to explore whether toddlers have access to
a concept of causation that integrates an understanding of
predictive relationships, interventions and physical relations
among events.
Recent research suggests that this integrated understanding may
be absent in early childhood [6]. In particular, although
preschoolers readily move from observing predictive relationships
among physical events to trying causal interventions, toddlers do
not. In a study upon which the current work is based [6], children
were familiarized to a two-part predictive event in which (1) a block
moved across a stage and contacted a base, and (2) a spinning toy
airplane, connected by a visible wire to the base, immediately
activated. Preschoolers (mean: 47 months) and toddlers (mean: 24
months) were equally successful at learning the predictive
relationship: in a catch trial, in which the toy did not activate,
virtually all the children spontaneously looked to the toy.
However, when asked to make the toy go, almost all the
preschoolers pushed the block towards the base and looked to
the toy; none of the toddlers did so. That is, no toddler
spontaneously initiated the action, and when prompted to perform
the action, all of the toddlers pushed the block to the base but none
predictively looked to the toy.
Two factors appeared to affect toddlers’ ability to move from
prediction to intervention: the presence of a dispositional agent
(i.e., an agent capable of intentional action) and the inclusion of
causal language. If instead of the block moving by itself during the
familiarization phase, the experimenter pushed the block into the
base, then toddlers performed the action themselves and
anticipated the outcome. If the events were described with causal
language (e.g., ‘‘The block can make it go’’), toddlers’ performance
improved; neutral language (‘‘Look at the block!’’) did not improve
performance.
These findings suggest that toddlers may not understand that
predictive relations can be potential causal events. Although there
are developmental changes in children’s causal knowledge [9–11],
a wealth of recent research has stressed the sophistication of
children’s causal reasoning abilities [12–14]. Critically however,
the causal events in such studies are almost always initiated by
dispositional agents (puppets or people) and/or described with
causal language (e.g., ‘‘blickets make the toy go’’). Exceptions to
this trend are Michottean launching events, in which one object
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strikes another object and immediately sets it in motion. However,
some researchers have suggested that infants’ causal perception of
launching events may be modular and distinct from other forms of
causal inference [15]. Thus, little is known about whether children
spontaneously recognize the possibility that non-agentive pre-
dictive relations are causal – a possibility recognized by 4-year-old
children [6] and arguably adults. By contrast, the importance of
dispositional agency to infants’ causal representations has been
widely documented. Infants represent dispositional agents, but not
objects, as potential causes of both object motion and change of
state events [16–18]. Arguably then, in the absence of dispositional
agency, toddlers, like infants, might fail to represent predictive
relations as potentially causal.
Alternatively, toddlers may represent predictive relations as
potential causal relations but have difficulty initiating causally
relevant actions for certain kinds of events. Researchers have
suggested that intentional action might, in general, lag behind
predictive looking either because the demands of planning and
executing motor responses interfere with children’s ability to
access task-relevant information [19–21], or because stronger
representations might be necessary for acting than for looking
[22]. Although there are important theoretical distinctions
between these claims, they are united in suggesting that a gap
between children’s ability to make successful predictions and their
ability to perform effective actions might reflect changes not in
children’s conceptual understanding but in their ability to manifest
their knowledge under complex task demands. If so, any additional
information that strengthens the representation of a causal
relationship might boost performance.
By assessing toddlers’ reasoning about predictive relations
independent of their ability to initiate actions, we can learn
whether dispositional agency and causal language merely facilitate
children’s ability to move from prediction to intervention, or
whether these factors affect children’s underlying conceptual
representations of predictive relations. In order to distinguish these
two accounts, we investigate children’s sensitivity to spatial
relations between causal agents and patients in physical events
using a looking time study. Of course spatial contact is neither
necessary nor sufficient for causality. As philosophers have pointed
out, if mere transmission through contact were sufficient for causal
inference, the transfer of chalk from a billiard stick to a billiard ball
would be as probable a cause of the ball’s subsequent motion as
the transfer of force [23]. Moreover, psychological causal events,
including chasing and fleeing events, occur without physical
contact [24,25]. Nonetheless, prior research suggests that infants’
expectations about spatial contact in the domain of physical
outcomes vary depending on whether an outcome does or does not
occur. In events that adults typically recognize as physical causal
interactions, research has shown that infants (1) expect outcomes
to occur on contact and (2) expect outcomes not to occur at
a distance [16,26–30]. For example, 7.5-month-old infants have
been shown to expect an object to move upon contact from
another object, and not to move if an object stops short of
contacting it [27]. Similarly, infants who have seen a hand move
behind an occluder and a box break apart expect the hand to have
contacted the box if it breaks and expect the hand to have stopped
short of contact if the box does not break; moreover, they do not
have these expectations if the candidate cause is not a dispositional
agent (e.g., is a train rather than a hand) [16]. Following the logic
of these studies, in the current study we look at whether toddlers
represent predictive relations in accord with principles of physical
contact causality.
Using an occluded causal inference paradigm [16,26,29], we
show toddlers a block that slides towards a base; a toy connected to
the base either does or does not activate. An occluder prevents
children from seeing whether the block contacts the base. On test,
we remove the occluder and measure looking time. If toddlers’
failure to intervene in Bonawitz and colleagues [6] is due only to
the difficulty involved in initiating motor responses, then children
should be sensitive to the spatial relations in all the events. By
contrast, if toddlers require dispositional agency or causal language
to represent the causal nature of predictive events, then they
should be sensitive to the spatial relations as a function of the
outcome in the presence of these cues, but not in their absence.
This paradigm thus allows us to investigate whether dispositional
agency and causal language are factors that merely strengthen
existing causal representations and support successful interventions
or whether these factors are required for initially representing such
events as causal. In Experiments 1 and 2, we investigate the
influence of dispositional agency; in Experiment 3, we investigate
the influence of causal language.
Results and Discussion
In Experiment 1, we investigated the primary cue shown to
facilitate toddlers’ ability to represent predictive relations as
potential causal relations: having the event initiated by a disposi-
tional agent. We predicted that toddlers would be sensitive to
spatial relations for events initiated by a dispositional agent, but
not for otherwise identical events that do not involve dispositional
agents.
Unlike prior research that compared toddlers’ causal reasoning
about events involving dispositional agents to events involving
objects, we used an inferred dispositional agent rather than a visible
dispositional agent. In this we were inspired by previous research
[17,18] suggesting that infants posit hidden agents when an object
emerges in motion. If for instance, a beanbag emerges from the
right side of a stage, 7-month-olds look longer when a previously
hidden hand is revealed on the left side of the stage than the right.
We used an inferred dispositional agent to preclude the possibility
that toddler’s looking times could simply be driven by attention to
the agent itself (i.e., infants might look longer at events involving
hands than events that do not). Thus, we compared two closely
matched conditions: one in which a block began to move
spontaneously (the Spontaneous condition) and one in which
a block emerged from off-stage already in motion (the Inferred
Agent condition). If toddlers represent hidden agents when objects
emerge in motion, and represent agent-initiated but not
spontaneously occurring events as causal, they should be sensitive
to spatial relations in the Inferred Agent condition but not the
Spontaneous condition.
Toddlers first viewed 6 familiarization events (3 On trials, 3 Off
trials, in an alternating presentation) in which a block traveled
across a stage towards a base block, disappearing behind an
occluder (see Figure 1). Toddlers saw the block start its motion
from rest on the stage (Spontaneous condition) or saw it emerge
from behind an initial barrier (Inferred Agent condition). In On
trials, following the block’s disappearance, a toy plane, connected
to the base via a wire began to spin. In Off trials, the block travelled
behind the occluder, but the airplane did not spin. Following the
familiarization phase, toddlers viewed a single test trial in which
the block moved towards the base, disappearing behind the
occluder. The toy then activated during the test event (Toy On
conditions) or did not (Toy Off conditions). Following the toys’
activation (or failure to activate), the occluder was removed to
reveal the block either touching (Contact) or at a distance (Gap)
from the base. We measured looking time to the test event display
Toddlers’ Reasoning about Predictive Events
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(Toy On/Contact, Toy Off/Contact, Toy On/Gap, or Toy Off/
Gap) until the toddler looked away for 2 consecutive seconds.
To evaluate toddlers’ looking time to the test events (see
Figure 2), we conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
Agency (Inferred Agent vs. Spontaneous), Activation (Toy On vs.
Toy Off), and Spatial Relation (Contact vs. Gap) as between-
subjects factors. This analysis yielded a main effect of Activation,
F(1, 88) = 32.69, p,.0001. Toddlers looked longer at the test
event when the airplane moved (9.19 s) than when it did not
(3.58 s). There was also a 2-way interaction between Activation
and Spatial Relation, F(1, 88) = 8.88, p= .004 which was qualified
by a 3-way interaction between Agency, Activation, and Spatial
Relation, F(1, 88) = 4.19, p= .044. There were no other main
effects or interactions.
We conducted separate ANOVAs in each condition to follow-up
this analysis. In the Inferred Agent condition, there was amain effect
of Activation; F(1, 44) = 28.95, p,.0001. Toddlers looked longer
when the airplane moved (11.22 s) than when it did not (4.35 s).
There was also an interaction between Activation and Spatial
Relation, F(1, 44) = 14.94, p,.001. This interaction reflected the
fact that toddlers looked longer at the gap event when the airplane
moved, t(22) = 2.99, p= .007, but longer at the contact event when
the airplane did not move, t(22) = 3.00, p= .007.
A different pattern emerged in the Spontaneous condition.
There was a main effect of Activation, F(1, 44) = 8.53, p= .005.
Toddlers looked longer when the airplane moved (7.2 s) than
when the airplane did not (2.8 s). No other main effects or
interactions approached significance. In the Spontaneous condi-
tion, toddlers did not discriminate among the test events.
Results from Experiment 1 suggest that only toddlers in the
Inferred Agent condition represented the block as the cause of the
airplane’s motion. These children looked longest when the test
event violated contact causality: (1) when the block stopped short
of the base but the toy activated or (2) when the block contacted
the base but the toy did not activate. By contrast, when the block
moved spontaneously, toddlers did not differentiate the test events.
Thus, strikingly, merely occluding the onset of the block’s motion
Figure 1. Procedure used in Experiments 1–3. In Experiment 1, toddlers were assigned to either the Inferred Agent or Spontaneous condition.
They viewed 6 familiarization trials (3 On, 3 Off, in alternation) in which a block emerged from behind the right side barrier (row 1), traveled towards
the base on the left side of the stage (row 2), and disappeared behind the screen (row 3). The beginning of the test events was identical to the
familiarization events (rows 1–2). Following the disappearance of the block, the experimenter removed the screen to reveal the block in contact or at
a distance from the base, and the toy either on or off. Experiment 2 used the same materials depicted in the Inferred Agent condition; the block
began moving either from onstage (Spontaneous condition) or from behind the right-side barrier (Inferred Agent condition). Instead of the test
events depicted, the right-side barrier was removed on test to reveal a hand behind the barrier. Experiment 3 used the Familiarization and Test
procedures depicted in the Spontaneous condition and the events were described with either causal or non-causal language.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034061.g001
Figure 2. Results from Experiment 1. Looking time (61 SD) to the
final test events in Experiment 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034061.g002
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allowed toddlers to make predictions about contact causality that
they failed to make when the onset of motion was visible. These
results are consistent with the hypothesis that dispositional agency
facilitates toddlers’ ability to represent predictive relations as
causal.
However, while consistent with this hypothesis, we have no
positive evidence that toddlers’ success in the Inferred Agent
condition in Experiment 1 was due to inferring the presence of
a hidden agent. To test this, we presented the same familiarization
events in Experiment 2 as in Experiment 1 but at test, rather than
reveal the spatial relation between the block and the base, we
removed the barrier on the right of the stage to reveal a person’s
hand; the airplane always activated during the test event.
Following the logic of Saxe and colleagues [17,18], if toddlers
infer a hidden agent only when the block emerges in motion, then
toddlers in the Spontaneous condition should look longer at the
hand than those in the Inferred Agent condition.
Toddlers’ looking times supported this prediction; toddlers
inferred that there was a hidden dispositional agent when the block
emerged in motion but not when it moved spontaneously. An
analysis of toddlers’ looking time to the test event revealed that
toddlers looked significantly longer in the Spontaneous (17.62 s)
than the Inferred Agent condition (9.96 s), t(22) = 3.43, p= .002.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that toddlers represented the
events causally in the Inferred Agent condition of Experiment 1
because they believed that a dispositional agent initiated the
events.
Why did toddlers fail to make differential predictions in the
Spontaneous condition? We have suggested that toddlers do not
readily represent objects as causes; they thus failed to represent the
non-agent event causally. However, the spontaneous movement of
the block itself violated the expectation that physical objects move
only when they are contacted [27]. Thus, the initial spontaneous
movement of the block might have confused the toddlers and
disrupted any further expectations.
Arguing against this possibility, note that there was no difference
between conditions in the number of toddlers who met the
inclusion criteria (i.e., who predictively looked to the plane during
the familiarization phase). Nor was there any difference between
conditions in toddlers’ overall looking times. This suggests that
children did not find the spontaneous movement of the block
particularly disruptive.
However, if as we have suggested, it is the absence of
a dispositional agent rather than the presence of spontaneous
movement that interferes with children’s expectations of contact
causality, then even in the face of spontaneous movement children
should represent contact causality given other cues to the causal
relationship. Previous research [6] suggests that causal language
acts as such a cue. When spontaneously occurring events are
described causally, toddlers intervene and anticipate the target
outcome. Causal language might help extend children’s causal
representations for either of two (not mutually exclusive) reasons.
First, causal language testifies that an observed relationship is
indeed an instance of direct causation. Second, the fact that the
same language is used to describe predictive relations and agent
interventions (e.g., ‘‘The block can make it go.’’; ‘‘Can you make it
go?’’) might highlight the common underlying structure [6].
In Experiment 3 we looked at whether causal language similarly
supports toddler’s sensitivity to contact causality. In the Causal
Language conditions, the experimenter drew children’s attention to
the stage at the onset of each familiarization trial by saying, ‘‘The
block can make it go.’’ The Non-causal Language condition was
identical except the experimenter said, ‘‘Here’s my block.’’ If
causal language supports toddlers’ sensitivity to contact causality,
then this would suggest both that spontaneous movement is not
itself an obstacle to toddlers’ causal representations, and that
causal language affects children’s representations of events, not
merely their ability to engage in causally relevant actions.
Alternatively, if toddlers are simply confused by the spontaneous
motion of the block, which then interferes with their subsequent
representations of the event, then they should not be sensitive to
contact relations even in the presence of causal language.
An analysis of toddlers’ looking time to the final test event (see
Figure 3) revealed that they were sensitive to contact causality only
in the Causal Language condition. We conducted an ANOVA
with Language (Causal vs. Non-Causal), Activation (Toy On vs.
Toy Off), and Spatial Relation (Contact vs. Gap) as between-
subjects factors. The analysis yielded a significant main effect of
Language, F(1, 120) = 26.99, p,.0001 and a main effect of
Activation, F(1, 120) = 18.00, p,.0001. Toddlers looked longer in
the Causal language (7.72 s) than the Non-causal language
conditions (4.40 s) and looked longer when the airplane moved
(7.43 s) than when it did not (4.70 s). Second, this analysis yielded
significant 2-way interactions between Language and Activation,
F(1, 120) = 7.52, p= .007, and between Spatial Relation and
Activation, F(1, 120) = 4.83, p= .03, which were qualified by a 3-
way interaction between the Language, Activation, and Spatial
Relation, F(1, 120) = 6.44, p= .012.
To follow-up this analysis, we conducted separate ANOVAs on
toddlers’ looking time to the test event in each condition, with
Activation and Spatial Relation as between-subject factors. In the
Causal language condition, there was a significant main effect of
Activation, F(1, 60) = 17.85, p,.0001. Toddlers looked longer
when the airplane moved (9.97 s) than when it did not (5.48 s).
There was also a significant interaction between Activation and
Spatial Relation, F(1, 60) = 8.21, p= .006. This interaction
reflected the fact that toddlers looked longer at the gap event when
the airplane moved, t(30) = 2.02, p= .05, but looked longer at the
contact event when the airplane did not move, t(30) = 2.50,
p= .018.
A different pattern emerged in the Non-causal language
condition. The three-way ANOVA yielded no significant main
effects or interactions (all ps..05). In the absence of causal
language, toddlers did not discriminate among the test events.
The results from Experiment 3 suggest that only toddlers in the
Causal Language condition represented the predictive relationship
as a causal relationship. In that condition, toddlers looked longest
(1) when the block had not made contact with the base when the
airplane activated and (2) when the block had made contact with
Figure 3. Results from Experiment 3. Looking time (61 SD) to the
final test events in Experiment 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034061.g003
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the base when the airplane failed to activate. These results
additionally suggest that spontaneous movement does not prevent
toddlers from forming causal representations; when spontaneously
occurring events were described with causal language, toddlers
were sensitive to the contact relations. Together with previous
work [6], the results of Experiments 1 and 3 suggest that in the
absence of a dispositional agent and causal language toddlers do
not merely have difficulty initiating causal interventions, but they
do not even have expectations about contact between the potential
cause and effect.
Thus, the current findings suggest that toddlers are sensitive to
spatial relations as a function of the outcome only when they can
infer the presence of a dispositional agent (Experiment 1) or when
events are described with causal language (Experiment 3). Prior
research [6] showed that dispositional agency and causal language
facilitate toddlers’ ability to spontaneously intervene on predictive
relations. Together with the current findings, it appears that
dispositional agency and causal language support children’s ability
to represent predictive relations among novel events as causal
relations.
The conclusions from the current study rest upon an
assumption that toddlers’ differential expectation of spatial
relations can be taken as evidence for causal representations. As
reviewed in the Introduction, we believe that sensitivity to contact
relations as a function of the outcome suggests that children have
interpreted an event causally. In the current study, toddlers did not
simply discriminate contact events from gap events in the Inferred
Agent and Causal Language conditions; their looking patterns
differed depending on the toy’s activation. If the outcome
occurred, toddlers looked longer at gap events; if the outcome
did not occur, looked longer at contact events. Infants tend to
show this pattern of looking only for physical events in which
adults typically represent causally. This does not imply that
children expect all causal outcomes to require contact; prior
research suggests that children may suspend contact constraints for
non-physical, social interactions such as chasing/fleeing [24,25].
Moreover, we do not suggest that young children would be unable
to learn causal relationships between events that do not involve
contact; when a dispositional agent initiates the events, children
readily learn such relations (e.g., between flipping a switch and
a light turning on) [6]. However, this study adds to the evidence
that, for those events that adults represent causally, infant have
differential expectations about contact relations as a function of
event outcomes.
In the current study, we assumed that toddlers would represent
the block and the base as objects (i.e., rather than agents).
Arguably however, and contrary to our intended manipulation,
toddlers might have represented the block as a dispositional agent
in the Spontaneous and language conditions because the block
engaged in self-propelled motion. There are several reasons
however, to believe that this was not the case. First, previous
research suggests that self-propelled motion is not, in and of itself,
a sufficient cue for infants and toddlers to attribute agency
[24,25,31–35]; children require additional cues (e.g., contingent
responding, non-Newtonian motion). Second, if, toddlers had
attributed animacy to the block, they should have succeeded in all
conditions of the current study, as an agent (visible or inferred)
would then have been involved in all of the predictive events.
Third, in previous work using a very similar paradigm [6] toddlers
had ample opportunity to interact with the block and toddlers
engaged only in object-directed play (e.g., banging the block) never
in agent-directed play (e.g., talking to the block). Finally, if toddlers
had treated the block as an agent in the Spontaneous and
Language conditions than in the Inferred Agent condition, one
might have expected them to look longer at the block overall in
those conditions; however, we found no overall differences in
looking time across conditions.
Thus we believe that the results of the current study are
consistent with other work showing that infants accept disposi-
tional agents, but not objects, as candidate causes of physical
motion [36] and change of state events [16]. Michottian launching
events remain an important exception; infants as young as 6-
months distinguish causal agents and causal patients in launching
events, even though no dispositional agents are present [37].
However, such ‘‘perceptual causality’’ depends on the precise
spatio-temporal properties of the events, suggesting it might be
encapsulated from other kinds of causal reasoning [15,37–41].
The current findings suggest that, outside of arguably modular
processes, children might not represent the causal structure of non-
agentive events until relatively late in development.
If so, language may play an important role in extending
children’s causal representations. Simply by testifying that a novel
event is indeed causal, language might broaden the range of events
that toddlers recognize as instances of causation. Additionally, the
use of common causal language across superficially distinct
contexts might help children integrate initially distinct representa-
tions (e.g., of predictive relations, spatiotemporal relations, and the
outcome of interventions) into an adult-like notion of causality
[6,42]. Further research is necessary to better understand the
interactions between language and causal reasoning and to
establish precisely which aspects of causal language affect
children’s causal representations.
Finally, we note that the use of infant looking time as a measure
of conceptual understanding has been subject to debate [43,44].
This study establishes a convergence between looking time
measures (used here) and the action measures used in closely
matched previous work [6]. This convergence may help validate
sensitivity to contact causality as an index of causal understanding
in infancy research [16,26,27,29,30].
These findings highlight the importance of dispositional agency
and causal language in the development of causal reasoning.
Although further research is needed to uncover the trajectory of
causal representations in early childhood and the precise role of
causal language in supporting these representations, the current
study helps fill the gap between research on infants’ restricted
causal representations and the sophisticated causal reasoning of
later childhood.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Institutional Review
Board approved the procedures for all research described in this
paper. We obtained written consent from the participants’ parents.
Participants
Two-hundred-forty-eight toddlers (mean: 24.1 months, range –
18–30 months) were recruited at a Children’s Museum. An
additional 20 toddlers were recruited but not included in the final
sample due to: inability to complete the session (n = 7), parental
interference (n = 3), or failure to predictively look during the
familiarization trials (n = 10). In Experiment 1, twelve toddlers
were assigned to each of eight conditions crossing three factors:
Agency (Inferred Agent or Spontaneous), Activation (Toy On or
Toy Off), and Spatial Relation (Contact or Gap). In Experiment 2,
toddlers were assigned to an Inferred Agent or a Spontaneous
condition. In Experiment 3, sixteen toddlers were assigned to each
of eight conditions crossing three factors: Language (Causal or
Toddlers’ Reasoning about Predictive Events
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Non-causal), Activation (Toy On or Toy Off), and Spatial Relation
(Contact or Gap). There were no age differences across conditions
within each experiment.
Materials
All events occurred on a white stage (60 cm2650 cm2) that hid
a confederate from view. A barrier was positioned to the far right
of the stage (See Figure 1). An orange block (the base) and a purple
block (both 6 cm3) were on opposite ends of the stage. The purple
block was attached to a stick extending through the floor of the
stage, allowing the hidden confederate to surreptitiously move the
block across the stage to the base. A toy airplane, visibly attached
to the base by an orange wire, was located on the back stage wall.
During familiarization, a screen (22628 cm) occluded the spatial
relationship between the block and base.
Procedures
Experiment 1. The block began at the far right of the stage
in the Spontaneous condition and behind the right side barrier in
the Inferred Agent condition (See Figure 1). The experimenter
drew the toddlers’ attention to the stage saying, ‘‘Watch my
show.’’ Toddlers viewed an On trial and then an Off trial. In the On
trial, the block moved towards the base and disappeared behind
the screen. Once the block disappeared, the airplane began to
spin. At the end of the trial the stage was covered by a curtain and
the scene was reset. The Off trials were identical, except that the
airplane did not spin. The experimenter ended the trial after the
airplane spun for 3 s (On trial) or (Off trial) after the toddler
predictively looked towards the airplane or 3 s, whichever came
first. This procedure was repeated twice, for a total of 6
familiarization trials. In order to proceed to the test phase,
toddlers had to predictively look to the airplane on at least two Off
trials. For all experiments, there were no significant differences
across conditions in the number of toddlers who were dropped
from subsequent analysis because they failed to predictively look
during the Off familiarization trials.
The start of each test event was identical to the familiarization:
the block moved towards the base, disappearing behind the screen.
Toddlers either saw events in which the airplane activated during
the test event (Toy On conditions) or did not (Toy Off conditions).
The experimenter then said, ‘‘Look at this!’’ and removed the
screen, revealing the block either touching (Contact conditions) or
at a distance (Gap conditions) from the base.
Experiment 2. The familiarization phase in Experiment 2
was similar to Experiment 1, with the following exception. In the
Inferred Agent condition, the block emerged from off-stage
already in motion. In the Spontaneous condition, the block was
adjacent to the barrier and began moving spontaneously. Toddlers
viewed 6 familiarization events identical to those in Experiment 1.
Following familiarization, all toddlers viewed the same test event.
The block moved towards the base, disappearing behind the
occluder. The experimenter said, ‘‘Look at this!’’ and lowered the
far right barrier, revealing a hand at rest, palm facing the block.
Experiment 3. The procedure mirrored the Spontaneous
condition in Experiment 1, except that at the start of each
familiarization trial the experimenter used either causal or non-
causal language to draw children’s attention to the stage. In the
Causal Language conditions, the experimenter said, ‘‘The block
can make it go.’’ In the Non-causal Language condition, the
experimenter said, ‘‘Here’s my block.’’ Although the conditions
differed in the reference to ‘‘it’’ (i.e., the toy plane), this difference
did not seem to affect children’s ability to encode the relationship
given that toddlers were equally good at learning the predictive
relationship between the block and the toy in both conditions.
Coding
The experimenter ended each familiarization trial when he
judged that the child looked away for 2 consecutive seconds. The
experimenter viewed the toddlers’ looking towards the entire stage
by looking at the video camera screen that recorded the toddlers’
looking. In a few instances, the experimenter misjudged the 2-
second look-away criterion and ended the test event early, before
the child had actually looked away for 2 consecutive seconds. The
data from these participants were removed and subsequently
replaced with data from new participants. For all experiments,
there were no significant differences across conditions in the
number of toddlers removed and replaced.
Following data collection, looking times were coded from video,
with the coder blind to the test event. A third of the clips from each
Experiment were reliability coded; inter-rater reliability was high
throughout, r2..9. The first coder’s data were used for all
analyses.
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